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For many generations, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have called for 
treaties to be negotiated with Australian governments. In the face of Commonwealth 
inaction, states and territories have commenced treaty processes with Indigenous 
communities whose traditional lands fall within their borders. This article examines 
how the United States and Canada have negotiated treaties with Indigenous peoples 
and details the ongoing Australian processes in order to determine the most appro-
priate means of entering into treaties in the Australian federation. It concludes that 
while the state and territory processes are positive and offer the potential to realise 
valuable outcomes, it is preferable for treaties to be conducted with both federal and 
subnational governments. This should be undertaken by a Makarrata Commission 
comprising representatives of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and 
federal, state, and local governments. 
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I   IN TROD UC TIO N 
None of the land councils can tell me anything about treaty. What does the 
word treaty mean? Nothing. It means nothing to Yolngu people. The men of-
fering us the word treaty, will it be nice or will it be no good? It has to be the 
federal government and not the Northern Territory government.1 
… [W]e are not convinced that you can wait for a national process that has 
never ever delivered in relation to righting these wrongs …2 
These statements highlight a tension in the debate over treaty-making in 
Australia. In the first, Gumatj leader Galarrwuy Yunupingu gives voice to a 
widespread belief that treaties with Indigenous peoples are international 
agreements that must be negotiated with the Australian government.3 In the 
second, Gavin Jennings, the Special Minister of the State of Victoria, speaks 
to a political reality: in the absence of action at the federal level, state and 
territory treaty processes are currently the only viable vehicle for treaty-
making in Australia. In this article, we explore how this tension may be 
resolved with the aim of assessing whether state and territory treaty processes 
are legitimate, and discerning what is the best way to pursue treaties in the 
Australian federation. 
Treaties and other legal agreements between Indigenous political commu-
nities and those who have colonised their lands have been, and continue to 
be, negotiated around the globe. In Part II we outline how a treaty is distinct 
from other legal arrangements.4 We argue that a treaty is a special type of 
negotiated legal relationship that recognises an inherent right to sovereignty 
 
 1 Galarrwuy Yunupingu (Speech, Barunga Agreement Signing, 8 June 2018), cited in Chelsea 
Heaney, ‘NT Signs Historic Barunga Agreement to Begin Indigenous Treaty Talks’, NT 
News (online, 8 June 2018) <https://perma.cc/2PC3-JDP7>. 
 2 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 21 June 2018, 2893–4 (Gavin 
Jennings). 
 3 See, eg, ibid 2870 (Luke O’Sullivan). 
 4 See also Harry Hobbs and George Williams, ‘The Noongar Settlement: Australia’s First 
Treaty’ (2018) 40(1) Sydney Law Review 1. 
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and acknowledges or establishes institutional arrangements to exercise some 
form of self-government. 
In Part III, we explore treaty-making in its historic and contemporary 
forms in the United States and Canada. Although treaties have been negotiat-
ed across the world, these two states, as federations with entrenched constitu-
tions and homes to hundreds of diverse Indigenous political communities, are 
valuable comparators to tease out lessons for the emerging processes in 
Australia. Our study reveals two distinct models of treaty-making in these 
federations. In the United States, despite the contemporary proliferation of 
subnational agreements struck between Native American tribes and state and 
local governments, the constitutional allocation of legislative and executive 
authority vests the federal government with sole responsibility for treaty-
making. By contrast, while treaties were initially struck between the British 
Crown or national government and First Nations in Canada, today provincial 
governments in that country play a key role in the negotiation and settlement 
of modern treaties. 
The shift towards subnational treaties in Canada and other forms of 
agreements in the United States has sparked contention.5 For some Indige-
nous scholars and activists, negotiating with second and third order tiers of 
government challenges their distinctive status as sovereign nations.6 Con-
versely, other Indigenous peoples view as desirable any agreement that 
responds to practical problems facing their community by strengthening and 
affirming their autonomy.7 We do not take a position in this debate, but 
simply note that this is an important consideration for contemporary treaty-
making in Australia. Our focus is instead on the legal and related questions 
that impact upon the making of treaties within the Australian federation. 
In Part IV, we explore the emerging treaty processes in Australia, examin-
ing the steps undertaken in Victoria, the Northern Territory and Queensland, 
as well as the abandoned negotiations in South Australia and the single South 
West Native Title Settlement (‘Noongar Treaty’)8 in Western Australia. While 
the formal processes in Victoria and the Northern Territory are in their initial 
stages, sufficient time has elapsed to commence a preliminary assessment. In 
 
 5 See below nn 287–95 and accompanying text. 
 6 See below nn 292, 312 and accompanying text. 
 7 See generally Darryl Cronin, ‘Indigenous Disadvantage, Indigenous Governance and the 
Notion of a Treaty in Australia: An Indigenous Perspective’ in Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission and Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies 
(eds), Treaty: Let’s Get It Right! (Aboriginal Studies Press, 2003) 151. 
 8 South West Native Title Settlement, signed 8 June 2015 (not yet entered into force). 
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June 2018, the Victorian Parliament enacted the Advancing the Treaty 
Process with Aboriginal Victorians Act 2018 (Vic) (‘Victorian Treaty Process 
Act’), which affirms the government’s commitment to treaty consultations by 
requiring the State to recognise an Aboriginal representative body through 
which a treaty negotiation framework will be established.9 That same month, 
the Northern Territory government and the four Aboriginal Land Councils 
entered into the Barunga Agreement, a memorandum of understanding 
committing the parties to consult with Aboriginal Territorians in order to 
discern their aspirations for a treaty.10 Finally, while Queensland only 
committed to a conversation about treaty in July 2019, treaty has been part of 
the government’s policy platform since 2016.11 
Not every process is progressing smoothly. The same day that the Ba-
runga Agreement was struck, a newly elected South Australian government 
formally stepped away from its predecessor’s commitments to treaty-
making.12 Likewise, although Western Australia remains committed to the 
Noongar Treaty despite a change in government, several Noongar people 
prevented its implementation in February 2017.13 Swift federal intervention 
followed to permit the settlement to proceed,14 but further objections have 
meant the Noongar Treaty has still not entered into force. As these two 
examples highlight, treaty processes in Australia are vulnerable to political 
fluctuations — on both sides. 
Our exploration of the treaty processes in Australia and internationally 
contributes to a clearer understanding of contemporary treaty-making. In this 
project we follow the path of Jill Gallagher, a Gunditjmara woman from 
western Victoria and the Victorian Treaty Advancement Commissioner. In 
articulating her role, Gallagher explains that she is interested in comparative 
examination, in order ‘to see if we can learn something from them’, to ‘[t]ake 
 
 9 Advancing the Treaty Process with Aboriginal Victorians Act 2018 (Vic) s 9 (‘Victorian 
Treaty Process Act’). 
 10 Barunga Agreement, The Aboriginal Land Councils–Northern Territory, signed 8 June 2018 
(Memorandum of Understanding). 
 11 Queensland Labor, ‘Queensland State Policy Platform 2016’ (State Conference of the 
Queensland Branch of the Australian Labor Party, 29–30 October 2016) 93 [8.190] (‘Policy 
Platform 2016’). 
 12 Michael Owen, ‘Aboriginal People Failed by “Expensive Gesture” Treaties’, The Australian 
(online, 11 June 2018) <https://perma.cc/Y9BY-YU2Q>. 
 13 McGlade v Native Title Registrar (2017) 251 FCR 172. 
 14 Native Title Amendment (Indigenous Land Use Agreements) Act 2017 (Cth) sch 1 item 1, 
amending Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 24CD(2)(a) (‘Native Title Act’). 
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some good bits, maybe not some of the bad bits’.15 In Part V, we reflect on 
the lessons learned internationally and across Australia to consider how 
treaties with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples should be pursued. 
I I   WH AT IS  A TREATY? 
There are many examples of contracts or agreements between Indigenous 
peoples and governments, both in Australia and around the world.16 In 
Australia, for instance, there are agreements relating to land rights,17 joint 
management of national parks,18 and resource benefit-sharing agreements,19 
among many others. These agreements can secure important outcomes and 
may empower Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to play a mean-
ingful role in the development and implementation of solutions to problems 
faced by their communities. However, they are not treaties. 
As we have established elsewhere, a treaty is a special kind of agreement 
that satisfies three conditions.20 These conditions are drawn from contempo-
rary international human rights instruments concerning Indigenous peoples 
and from modern comprehensive land settlements being negotiated in 
Canada. First, a treaty must recognise Indigenous peoples as a distinct polity 
based on their status as prior self-governing communities who owned and 
occupied the land now claimed by the state.21 Acknowledgment of this status 
 
 15 Jill Gallagher (Speech, University of Melbourne, 10 May 2018) 
<https://victreatyadvancement.org.au/news/guest-lecture-university-melbourne>. 
 16 See generally Marcia Langton et al (eds), Settling with Indigenous People: Modern Treaty 
and Agreement-Making (Federation Press, 2006). 
 17 Starkey v South Australia (2014) 319 ALR 231 (Federal Court); ‘Dja Dja Wurrung 
Settlement Commences’, Victoria State Government: Justice and Community Safety (Web 
Page, 15 January 2019) <https://www.justice.vic.gov.au/your-rights/native-title/dja-dja-
wurrung-settlement-commences>. 
 18 See, eg, Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) ss 374–83; 
‘Park Management’, Australian Government: Department of the Environment and Energy 
(Web Page) <https://www.environment.gov.au/topics/national-parks/kakadu-national-
park/management-and-conservation/park-management >. 
 19 See, eg, Western Cape Communities Co-Existence Agreement (Indigenous Land Use 
Agreement, 24 August 2001). For a statutory right in the Northern Territory, see Aboriginal 
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) s 48D. See generally Jon Altman, ‘Benefit 
Sharing Is No Solution to Development: Experiences from Mining on Aboriginal Land in 
Australia’ in Rachel Wynberg, Doris Schroeder and Roger Chennells (eds), Indigenous 
Peoples, Consent and Benefit Sharing: Lessons from the San-Hoodia Case (Springer, 2009) 
285. 
 20 Hobbs and Williams (n 4) 7–14. 
 21 Ibid 7. 
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differentiates Indigenous peoples from other citizens of the state, distin-
guishes the agreement from other legal forms, and reflects international law 
as affirmed in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (‘UNDRIP’).22 
Second, a treaty is a political agreement that must be reached by way of a 
fair process of negotiation between equals.23 Negotiation is the appropriate 
process for resolving differences between Indigenous peoples and the state as 
it reduces the risk that important rights and interests will be ignored, brings 
all relevant information and perspectives to the decision-making process, and 
‘recognises that winner-takes-all processes are unlikely to endure or produce 
good policy’.24 While securing a fair negotiation process can be challenging, 
the UNDRIP articulates a standard predicated on respecting the status of 
Indigenous peoples as a polity.25 
Third, a treaty requires both sides to accept a series of responsibilities so 
that the agreement can bind the parties in a relationship of mutual obliga-
tion.26 As part of this, Indigenous peoples are expected to withdraw all 
current and future claims relating to historical and contemporary disposses-
sion.27 But the state must also agree to certain conditions, for a treaty must 
contain more than symbolic recognition. While the content of any negotiated 
settlement will differ in accordance with the aspirations of each Indigenous 
political community, a treaty must recognise that Indigenous nations retain an 
inherent right to sovereignty.28 Consequently, as an exercise of that right, a 
treaty must empower Indigenous peoples with some form of decision-making 
and control that amounts to a form of self-government.29 This is both a 
concomitant of the recognition of an Indigenous people as a distinct political 
community, as required under the first condition, and a recognition that a 
treaty is designed to improve the lives of Indigenous communities and secure 
the foundations for a just relationship. As has been noted, a treaty is a 
 
 22 GA Res 61/295, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (2 October 2007, adopted 13 September 2007) arts 
6, 9, 33 (‘UNDRIP’). 
 23 Hobbs and Williams (n 4) 8–10. 
 24 Sean Brennan et al, Treaty (Federation Press, 2005) 8. 
 25 See, eg, UNDRIP (n 22) arts 9, 33. 
 26 Hobbs and Williams (n 4) 10. 
 27 Ibid 13 
 28 Ibid 10. 
 29 For discussion on institutions of self-rule for Indigenous communities, see Harry Hobbs, 
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples and Multinational Federalism in Australia’ 
(2018) 27(3) Griffith Law Review 307; Alison Vivian et al, ‘Indigenous Self-Government in 
the Australian Federation’ (2017) 20(1) Australian Indigenous Law Review 215. 
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marriage, not a divorce.30 The effect of this third condition is to exclude from 
the definition of treaty any agreement struck between Indigenous peoples and 
governments that acknowledges their distinct status but fails to recognise a 
domain of autonomy. 
I I I   TREATY-MAK IN G IN TERN AT IO N ALLY  
A  The United States 
In the early years of the American republic, questions arose over the man-
agement of Native American affairs. A key issue was whether treaty-making 
with Native Americans was the exclusive responsibility of the federal 
government, or whether it should also be the responsibility of the states ‘who 
inherited the sovereignty of the British Crown and who were intimately 
concerned with the Indians on their borders’.31 The 1777 Articles of Confed-
eration were ambiguous on this point,32 and several states protested against 
centralised administration. New York, for example, sought to ‘counteract and 
frustrate’ federal treaty commissioners seeking to negotiate with the Iroquois 
at Fort Stanwix in 1784,33 while Georgia, acting on its own, secured large 
land cession treaties with unauthorised Creek representatives,34 sparking 
hostilities between Creek bands and settlers.35 Recognising that land acquisi-
tion was a ‘principal source’ of contention with Native Americans and that 
 
 30 Carole Blackburn, ‘Producing Legitimacy: Reconciliation and the Negotiation of Aboriginal 
Rights in Canada’ (2007) 13(3) Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 621, 627. 
 31 Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly 
(University of California Press, 1994) 36–7; Vine Deloria Jr and Raymond J DeMallie, 
Documents of American Indian Diplomacy: Treaties, Agreements, and Conventions, 1775–
1979 (University of Oklahoma Press, 1999) vol 1, 14–15; See also David H Getches, 
Charles F Wilkinson and Robert A Williams Jr, Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law 
(Thomson West, 5th ed, 2005) 60–2. 
 32 Prucha (n 31) 38. See United States Articles of Confederation art IX.  
 33 Barbara Graymont, ‘New York State Indian Policy after the Revolution’ (1976) 57(4) New 
York History 438, 449, quoting Franklin B Hough, Proceedings of the Commissioners of 
Indian Affairs, Appointed by Law for the Extinguishment of Indian Titles in the State of New 
York (Joel Munsell, 1861) vol 2, 63. 
 34 See, eg, Treaty of Augusta, signed 1 November 1783. 
 35 Randolph C Downes, ‘Creek–American Relations, 1782–1790’ (1937) 21(2) Georgia 
Historical Quarterly 142, 145–6. 
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peaceful relations were essential to the development of the country, the 
framers of the 1788 United States Constitution sought to centralise control.36 
Three clauses of that document are relevant, though only two specifically 
refer to Native Americans. Article I § 8 vests Congress with the authority 
‘[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian Tribes’, while art I § 2 excludes ‘Indians not taxed’ from 
the population count of the House of Representatives.37 Further, under the 
treaty clause in art II § 2, the President is authorised to make treaties ‘with 
the [a]dvice and [c]onsent of the Senate’. The commerce and apportionment 
clauses suggest that Native American tribes were understood to be distinct 
political communities, but the failure to include reference to Native Ameri-
cans in the treaty clause provoked some doubt over which level of govern-
ment could negotiate treaties. Consequently, ‘[t]he 1780s and ’90s witnessed 
a vibrant debate over federalism and relations with Indians’.38 This was 
settled through the forceful assertion of federal authority. Although the treaty 
clause does not refer to Native Americans, President George Washington 
informed the Senate that he believed such treaties should be considered in the 
same manner as those negotiated with European nations.39 After some initial 
pushback, Washington’s position was accepted by the Senate, establishing a 
clear precedent that would set United States policy: the federal government 
alone would negotiate treaties.40 Over the following decades, some 379 
treaties were secured in this way.41 
The US Supreme Court affirmed the distinctive status of Native American 
political communities and their relationship with the federal and state 
governments in two cases in the early 19th century. Writing for the Court, 
Chief Justice John Marshall drew on the commerce clause to declare that 
while Native American tribes were not ‘foreign states’, neither were they US 
citizens; they were ‘domestic dependent nations’ whose relationship with the 
United States ‘resembles that of a ward to [its] guardian’.42 In signing 
 
 36 Robert N Clinton, ‘The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of 
Federal–State Conflict over the Management of Indian Affairs’ (1989) 69(2) Boston Univer-
sity Law Review 329, 371. 
 37 This language is repeated in the United States Constitution § 2 amend XIV. 
 38 Gregory Ablavsky, ‘Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause’ (2015) 124(4) Yale Law Journal 
1012, 1039–40. 
 39 Letter from George Washington to the United States Senate, 17 September 1789 
<https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-04-02-0032>. 
 40 Prucha (n 31) 73. 
 41 For a collection of these treaties, see Deloria and DeMallie (n 31). 
 42 Cherokee Nation v Georgia, 30 US (5 Peters) 1, 17–18 (1831). 
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treaties, Native American tribes did not surrender their inherent sovereignty, 
or their right to self-government; they remained ‘a distinct community, 
occupying [their] own territory … in which the laws of [the states] can have 
no force’.43 The commerce clause, his Honour explained, therefore vests 
authority to deal with Native American nations exclusively in the federal 
government.44 
Treaty-making between the United States and Native American tribes 
officially ceased in 1871, when Congress passed the Indian Appropriations 
Act 1871 (‘1871 Act’).45 This Act declared that the federal government would 
no longer acknowledge or recognise any ‘Indian nation or tribe within the 
territory of the United States’ as an ‘independent nation’ and prohibited the 
federal government from negotiating treaties with such groups.46 It did, 
however, preserve the obligations lawfully made and ratified under existing 
treaties,47 leaving many promises made prior to 1871 legally binding on the 
United States today. Scholars have pointed to a confluence of factors for the 
cessation of treaty-making, including the rise of racist attitudes that contend-
ed Native Americans could not understand the process nor its outcomes, as 
well as a growing cynicism that agreements were abrogated by government at 
its pleasure.48 The primary reason is more prosaic, however, and has nothing 
to do with a ‘change in the status, existence, or powers of Indian govern-
ments’;49 rather, it was a result of political infighting between the organs of 
the US government.50 
The treaty clause in art II § 2 excludes the House of Representatives from 
exercising any positive role in the ratification or supervision of treaties. The 
President is empowered to make treaties with ‘the [a]dvice and [c]onsent of 
the Senate’, and a treaty will not be ratified unless ‘two thirds of the Senators 
present concur’. Article I § 9 of the United States Constitution provides, 
however, that ‘[n]o [m]oney shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
 
 43 Worcester v Georgia, 31 US (6 Peters) 515, 520 (1832). 
 44 Ibid. 
 45 25 USC § 71 (2012) (‘1871 Act’). 
 46 Ibid. 
 47 Ibid. 
 48 For discussion of these factors, see Prucha (n 31) ch 12. 
 49 Robert J Miller, ‘Treaties between the Eastern Shawnee Tribe and the United States: 
Contracts between Sovereign Governments’ in Stephen Warren (ed), The Eastern Shawnee 
Tribe of Oklahoma: Resilience through Adversity (University of Oklahoma Press, 2017) 107, 
112. 
 50 Prucha (n 31) ch 12. 
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[c]onsequence of [a]ppropriations made by [l]aw’. Consequently, financing 
for negotiations and settlements, as well as the administration of Native 
American affairs more generally, must be approved by both houses of 
Congress. Concern within sections of the House of Representatives that the 
Senate was agreeing to extravagant treaty settlements, over which the House 
had no oversight, lead to a fight over the powers of each house.51 Following 
several years of impasse, Congress eventually agreed to a compromise. The 
1871 Act did not limit the prerogatives of the President and the Senate to 
make and ratify treaties, but, as noted above, declared that Native American 
tribes would no longer be considered independent nations.52 
The 1871 Act marked a radical legal shift in the United States govern-
ment’s relations with Native American tribes, but practically, treaty-making 
continued under different terminology.53 The 1871 Act did not obviate the 
need for political agreements; it simply meant that negotiations with Native 
American polities would be conducted by the executive and then approved as 
legislation by Congress as a whole, rather than solely ratified by the Senate.54 
Indeed, some of the agreements struck after 1871 ‘were a direct continuation 
of the treaty process’ and were perceived as such by both Native Americans 
and government officials.55 For instance, Francis Prucha notes that in 1874 
the House of Representatives printed a letter from the Secretary of the 
Interior urging ratification of a settlement with the eastern band of Shoshones 
in Wyoming under the title ‘Treaty with the Shoshone and Bannock Indi-
ans’.56 The tide was shifting, however, and agreements of this type finally 
ended in the coterminous United States at the turn of the 20th century. 
In two key cases in the 1880s and 1900s, the US Supreme Court departed 
from the earlier Marshall decisions and rewrote Native American relations 
with the federal government. In United States v Kagama (‘Kagama’),57 the 
Court upheld a statute extending federal criminal jurisdiction for certain 
 
 51 Ibid. See also Deloria and DeMallie (n 31) 233–8; Arthur Spirling, ‘US Treaty Making with 
American Indians: Institutional Change and Relative Power, 1784–1911’ (2012) 56(1) Amer-
ican Journal of Political Science 84, 87. 
 52 Prucha (n 31) 308–10. 
 53 Charles F Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a Modern 
Constitutional Democracy (Yale University Press, 1987) 101. 
 54 Miller (n 49) 112. 
 55 Prucha (n 31) 313; Deloria and DeMallie (n 31) 249–50. 
 56 Prucha (n 31) 316. See also Act of 15 December 1874, ch 2, 18 Stat 291. 
 57 118 US 375 (1886) (‘Kagama’). 
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major crimes into Native American reservations.58 Despite acknowledging 
that the United States Constitution failed to clearly provide for this authori-
ty,59 the Court offered two sources for this implied legislative power. First, 
because Native American nations were located within the territory of the 
United States, authority to regulate their affairs must exist somewhere. As 
earlier decisions had found the states did not possess such jurisdiction, it 
‘must exist in the National Government’.60 Second, drawing on language 
used in the Marshall cases, the Court characterised Native American tribes as 
‘wards of the nation’, dependent on federal government protection.61 In order 
to provide this protection, the Court reasoned that the federal government 
must possess the authority to regulate the internal affairs of Native American 
communities.62 This decision was extended several years later. In Lone Wolf v 
Hitchcock, the Court confirmed that Congress had ‘[p]lenary authority’ over 
Indian affairs, including the power to unilaterally abrogate treaty obligations 
and appropriate land without Native American consent, arising ‘by reason of 
its exercise of guardianship’.63 The Court held further that this power was 
political and not subject to judicial review.64 The effect was that negotiations 
were no longer legally necessary to take Native American land. 
Federal Native American policy at the turn of the century was dominated 
by theories of cultural absorption and practices of assimilation. Following the 
decision in Kagama, Congress enacted the Dawes Act 1887,65 which abol-
ished communal ownership and divided reservations into allotments for 
individual Native Americans. Any land remaining after allotment was 
classified as ‘excess’ and sold to non-Indigenous peoples.66 This law had 
significant consequences for the Indigenous estate: lands owned by Native 
Americans decreased from 138 million acres in 1887 to 52 million acres in 
 
 58 See 18 USC § 1153 (2012). 
 59 Kagama (n 57) 378–80 (Miller J for the Court). 
 60 Ibid 380. 
 61 Ibid 382. 
 62 Ibid 384. For criticism of this decision see, eg, Philip P Frickey, ‘Domesticating Federal 
Indian Law’ (1996) 81(1) Minnesota Law Review 31, 34–5. 
 63 187 US 553, 565 (White J for the Court) (1903) (‘Hitchcock’). See also Walter R Echo-
Hawk, In the Courts of the Conqueror: The 10 Worst Indian Law Cases Ever Decided (Ful-
crum, 2010) ch 7. 
 64 Hitchcock (n 63) 565 (White J for the Court). 
 65 Dawes Act 1887, ch 119, 24 Stat 388. 
 66 Ibid 388. 
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1934.67 Although the Indian New Deal reversed some of these practices and 
strengthened traditional authority structures,68 assimilation remained the 
dominant paradigm. In particular, policies from the mid-1940s sought to 
dismantle tribal sovereignty and end Native Americans’ distinctive relation-
ship with the federal government. Among other elements, Congress passed 
legislation granting state governments the power to assume jurisdiction over 
Native American reservations and terminated the legal status of more than 
100 tribes.69 However, termination did not necessarily abrogate treaties that 
had been negotiated. In Menominee Tribe of Indians v United States, the 
Supreme Court held that treaty obligations would only be nullified with 
express legislative intent.70 
The 1960s and ’70s saw a reappraisal. Growing appreciation that the poli-
cies of termination were morally wrong led to a shift towards ‘self-
determination’,71 under which the federal government recognised and 
empowered Native American communities to take a greater role in their own 
affairs. Limited recognition of tribal authority revived the practice of 
agreement-making between Native American communities and US govern-
ments, and today, tribes ‘expect and demand government-to-government 
relations’.72 Nonetheless, legal practices from the period of assimilation and 
absorption have altered the nature of that relationship. As a matter of law, 
Native American polities ‘have a status higher than that of states’,73 and are 
 
 67 Janet A McDonnell, The Dispossession of the American Indian: 1887–1934 (Indiana 
University Press, 1991) 121. 
 68 25 USC ch 14(V) (2012). See generally Graham D Taylor, The New Deal and American 
Indian Tribalism: The Administration of the Indian Reorganization Act, 1934–45 (University 
of Nebraska Press, 1980). 
 69 18 USC § 1162 (2012); 25 USC §§ 1321–6 (2012); 28 USC § 1360 (2012); HR Con Res 
108, 83rd Congress 67 Stat B132 (1953); Charles F Wilkinson and Eric R Biggs, ‘The Evolu-
tion of the Termination Policy’ (1977) 5(2) American Indian Law Review 139. See generally 
Donald L Fixico, Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945–1960 (Universi-
ty of New Mexico Press, 1986). 
 70 391 US 404, 413 (Douglas J for the Court) (1968). 
 71 Richard Nixon, ‘Special Message on Indian Affairs’ (Speech, United States Congress, 8 July 
1970) <https://www.epa.gov/tribal/president-nixon-special-message-indian-affairs-july-8-
1970>; George Pierre Castile, To Show Heart: Native American Self-Determination and 
Federal Indian Policy, 1960–1975 (University of Arizona Press, 1998). 
 72 Stephen Cornell and Joseph P Kalt, ‘American Indian Self-Determination: The Political 
Economy of a Successful Policy’ (Working Paper, Harvard Kennedy School, November 
2010) 3. 
 73 Native American Church v Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F 2d 131, 132 (10th Cir, 1959). 
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entitled to an exclusive relationship with the federal government,74 but a 
combination of legal and political factors have changed the status and 
dynamics of agreements reached with Native Americans. Devolution of 
federal powers to state governments in areas of Native American affairs 
under policies of assimilation and termination, US Supreme Court decisions 
eroding tribal sovereignty,75 and legislation weakening Indigenous land 
tenure, as well as the increasing complexity of personal and legal relations in 
modern society mean that, in practice, agreements are no longer struck solely 
with the federal government. Tribes across the country have signed thousands 
of contracts, compacts, memoranda of understanding, and other forms of 
agreement with state and local governments. 
In some cases, intergovernmental agreements are specifically provided for 
by federal legislation. Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 1988, for 
example, tribes must negotiate compacts with state governments concerning 
the regulation of casino gambling activities on reservations.76 In other cases, 
intergovernmental agreements have been adopted as an alternative to 
litigation. For instance, although Native American reservations have priority 
in water rights over non-Indigenous users,77 they often have little or no 
capital to construct and develop projects to take advantage of their legal 
entitlements.78 A combination of non-Indigenous anxiety over their own 
weak legal position and Native American desire to secure capital to develop 
their resources has encouraged the development of negotiated settlements.79 
Since 1978, 36 ‘Indian water rights settlements’ have been federally ap-
proved, either by Congress in statutory form or by executive order under the 
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Departments of Justice and the Interior.80 These settlements are government-
to-government agreements between tribes and the relevant state or federal 
government and legally protect Native American rights to water by quantify-
ing their allocation, recognising Native American administrative control over 
that allocation, authorising the construction and funding of water projects, 
and providing development economic funds.81 
These settlements and compacts are important agreements that highlight 
the shift in Native American relations with federal and state governments in 
the United States. Drawing on their status as government-to-government 
agreements, some scholars have characterised them as marking a ‘second 
treaty era’,82 or a ‘modern form of treaty’.83 However, while these agree-
ments may ‘vindicate [Indigenous] sovereignty’,84 they are not treaties of the 
form we described in Part II. Although they recognise the status and capacity 
of Native American political communities to negotiate and execute legal 
arrangements that secure valuable outcomes, they do not provide or establish 
institutional arrangements to exercise some form of self-government. In large 
part, this is because Native American sovereignty and self-government is 
already recognised in the United States.85 While they are not treaties, then, 
they are beneficial, complementary settlements that demonstrate how 
sovereign Indigenous nations can interact with federal and state governments 
to realise mutually beneficial goals. 
Shifting legal and political circumstances have encouraged the making of 
subnational agreements to realise mutual objectives, but Congress still retains 
authority over Native American affairs, and Native American nations 
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 81 Stern (n 80); Daniel McCool, Native Waters: Contemporary Indian Water Settlements and 
the Second Treaty Era (University of Arizona Press, 2002) 8 (‘Native Waters’). 
 82 McCool, Native Waters (n 81) 8. 
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continue to assert their distinctive relationship with the federal government. 
These two factors were critical in ensuring that the federal government was 
legally responsible for authorising the only modern treaty negotiated in the 
US. Unlike the coterminous United States, no historic treaties were reached 
between Native Alaskans and the federal government and very few reserva-
tions were established.86 Owing to Alaska’s remoteness, questions concerning 
Indigenous land rights were largely ignored. The 1867 Treaty of Cession by 
which the United States purchased Alaska from Russia, for instance, did not 
address Indigenous rights, providing simply that Native Alaskans would be 
subject to ‘such laws and regulations as the United States may … adopt in 
regard to aboriginal tribes’,87 while the Organic Act 1884 (‘Organic Act’), 
which instituted civil government in the territory, reserved decisions over 
land rights to future congressional legislation.88 
Alaska achieved statehood in 1959, but Indigenous land claims were still 
not settled. Continuing the ‘wait-and-see attitude’,89 the Alaska Statehood Act 
1958 (‘Alaska Statehood Act’) authorised the new state to select around 
416,800 km2 of federally controlled public territory,90 but required it to 
‘forever disclaim’ lands ‘which may be held by any Indians, Eskimos, or 
Aleuts’.91 Because Native Alaskan lands had not been delineated, this 
provision caused significant complications; Native Alaskans and the state 
both claimed title to the same land, and by 1966 Secretary of the Interior, 
Stewart Udall, was compelled to freeze land conveyances within Alaska to 
protect Indigenous claims.92 Discovery of the largest petroleum deposit in 
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North America at Prudhoe Bay the following year increased pressure on the 
land question.93 Following several years of negotiations between Native 
Alaskans, industry representatives, and the state and federal governments, 
agreement was finally reached. In exchange for extinguishing their claims 
and hunting and fishing rights, Native Alaskans obtained title to about 42 
million hectares (approximately 11% of the state) and received $962.5 
million in cash payments.94 Alaskan state government interests were repre-
sented during the negotiations, but the Organic Act vested authority for 
determining Indigenous land rights in Congress,95 meaning that the federal 
government was legally responsible for the settlement. The Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act 1971 (‘Alaska Native Claims Act’)96 was enacted by 
Congress and signed into law by President Nixon on 18 December 1971.97 
No equivalent legislation was passed by Alaska. 
The Alaska Native Claims Act satisfies our definition of a treaty. First, it 
recognises Native Alaskans as distinctive political communities, based on 
their status as prior self-governing communities. Second, although the terms 
of the settlement were largely adopted through congressional hearings,98 the 
structure of those hearings amounted to a form of negotiation in allowing 
important information and perspectives to be brought to the decision-making 
process. Legally, Native Alaskans did not have an ultimate vote on the 
settlement, but the legislation was not ratified without their support.99 
Finally, both Native Alaskans and non-Indigenous peoples accepted a 
series of mutual obligations and responsibilities in an effort to resolve 
competing demands and secure the foundations for a positive relationship. 
Native Alaskans agreed to withdraw their claims in exchange for a package 
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of benefits, including land and financial compensation.100 Although that 
package is silent on the issue of self-governance rights, it does not abrogate 
Native Alaskans’ inherent sovereignty,101 and it was assumed that those 
powers continued to exist.102 Indeed, in implicit recognition of their inherent 
sovereignty, the agreement empowers Native Alaskans to exercise decision-
making and control that amounts to a form of self-government through the 
establishment of 225 for-profit village corporations and 13 regional corpora-
tions.103 Supplementary legislation and amendments to the settlement have 
further enhanced rights to self-government,104 and demonstrated that a just 
relationship requires an ‘ongoing process of engagement and discussion’.105 
Nonetheless, the absence of explicit recognition of self-governance rights has 
been problematic; while the Alaska Supreme Court has determined that tribes 
continue to exercise decision-making authority over members and non-
members subject to their jurisdiction,106 the US Supreme Court has limited 
Native Alaskan self-governance in some areas.107 
B  Canada 
In the early years of settlement in Canada, agents of the Imperial Crown were 
solely responsible for negotiating agreements with First Nations. This 
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approach recognised that disputes with Indigenous communities would 
challenge peaceful trade and orderly settlement, so sought to preclude local 
governments and settlers from dealing with Indigenous land.108 Legally, this 
was confirmed in the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763 and the 1764 
Treaty of Niagara, where the Crown pledged to prevent colonial governments 
from ‘molest[ing]’ and ‘disturb[ing]’ First Nations.109 At confederation in 
1867, the nation-to-nation framework was entrenched; authority for negotiat-
ing treaties with Indigenous peoples fell to the Canadian government rather 
than the provinces. Section 91(24) of the British North America Act 1867 
(‘British North America Act’) empowered the new Canadian Parliament with 
exclusive legislative authority in respect of ‘Indians, and [l]ands reserved for 
the Indians’.110 Relying on this power, the government signed and ratified 11 
treaties with First Nations peoples to pursue settlement, agriculture, and 
resource development between 1871 and 1921.111 
The federal government refused to enter into further treaties after this 
date, but a change in policy was forced by the Canadian Supreme Court’s 
1973 decision in Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia (‘Cal-
der’),112 which found that Aboriginal title remained part of Canadian law.113 
By this stage, however, comprehensive land claims agreements — or modern 
treaties — would need to include the provinces as a party to any negotia-
tion.114 From the late 19th century, a series of judicial decisions, legislative 
incorporation of provincial laws, and a consequent ‘increase in activities 
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between First Nations and provincial governments’115 led to the provinces 
taking a greater role in First Nations affairs. This shift has occurred even 
though the division of constitutional powers between the federal and provin-
cial governments was retained under the Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, sch B 
(‘Constitution Act 1982’),116 thereby guaranteeing First Nations peoples a 
distinct relationship with the federal government akin to that in the United 
States. 
Canada’s constitutional arrangements provide that exclusive legislative 
authority over ‘Indians, and [l]ands reserved for the Indians’ lies with the 
federal government.117 However, an early dispute arose over which level of 
government obtained the beneficial interest of land surrendered under treaty. 
Section 109 of the British North America Act provides that ‘all [l]ands … 
belonging to the several [p]rovinces of Canada … at the [u]nion … shall 
belong to the several [p]rovinces’, while s 92(5) grants exclusive legislative 
authority to the provinces over the management and sale of provincial Crown 
lands. Drawing on s 109, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held in 
St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co v The Queen (‘St Catherine’s Milling’) 
that while the federal Crown may enter treaties, the beneficial interest of any 
land obtained under settlement flows to the relevant province, not the federal 
government.118 In reaching this decision, the Privy Council confirmed that 
although First Nations negotiated with and ceded territory to the central 
government, legally, ‘from beginning to end’ treaties were ‘a transaction 
between the Indians and the Crown’,119 ‘not an agreement between the 
Government of Canada and the Ojibway people’.120 
St Catherine’s Milling has had significant consequences for First Nations–
provincial relations. The decision divided the Crown into constituent parts, 
vastly reducing the scope of federal authority under s 91(24) by leaving it 
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applicable only on lands subject to Aboriginal title or reserves.121 This is not 
a large quantum: only 4% of Crown land in the provinces is federally 
controlled in the form of Indian reserves, national parks, or defence force 
bases.122 The remaining surrendered land, or land never subject to treaty — 
including approximately 94% of British Columbia — is legally administered 
by the provinces.123 As John Borrows notes, the decision therefore ‘eroded 
the promises of the Proclamation and Treaty of Niagara’, and allowed the 
provincial governments to grow in strength.124 
Canada’s allocation of constitutional powers has caused other complica-
tions for First Nations’ relationships with federal and provincial govern-
ments. One key issue, resolution of which has greatly enhanced the scope of 
provincial authority over First Nations, concerned whether a provincial 
government possessed legislative authority over reserves. The Canadian 
Supreme Court considered this question in Cardinal v Attorney-General 
(Alberta) (‘Cardinal’).125 In 1970, First Nations man Charlie Cardinal was 
charged with unlawful trafficking in big game for selling a piece of moose 
meat to a non-Indian at his home on an Indian reserve in Alberta, contrary to 
s 37 of the Alberta Wildlife Act.126 There was no dispute over the facts; the 
question was whether the Alberta legislation was invalid by virtue of 
s 91(24). By 6:3, the Court held that the law was valid, finding that although 
provincial parliaments had no legislative authority in relation to Indians or 
Indian reserves, reserves were not ‘enclaves within a Province within the 
boundaries of which Provincial legislation could have no application’.127 
Rather: 
Section 91(24) does not purport to define areas within a province within which 
the power of a province to enact legislation, otherwise within its powers, is to 
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be excluded. Section 37 of the Wildlife Act does not relate to Indians, qua Indi-
ans, and is applicable to all Indians, including those on Reserves.128 
Cardinal has been affirmed and extended. In Kruger v The Queen (‘Kru-
ger’),129 two Penticton First Nations people appealed their convictions for 
violating the British Columbia Wildlife Act130 by killing deer on their 
traditional lands (legally, unoccupied Crown lands) outside hunting season. 
In a unanimous decision the Canadian Supreme Court upheld their convic-
tions, holding that because the Wildlife Act applied uniformly throughout the 
territory, and was not ‘in relation to’ First Nations people, it was a law of 
general application.131 In reaching this decision, the Court explained that ‘the 
fact that a law may have graver consequence to one person than to another 
does not, on that account alone, make the law other than of general applica-
tion. There are few laws which have a uniform impact’.132 Several years later 
in Dick v The Queen (‘Dick’),133 the Court went further, declaring that to 
demonstrate a provincial enactment is not a law of general application 
requires proving that the ‘intent, purpose or policy of the legislation was to 
impair the status or capacities of a particular group’;134 the effect of a 
particular law is only evidence of intent.135 
In Delgamuukw v British Columbia,136 the Canadian Supreme Court took 
stock of the jurisprudence and established several key points. The Court 
confirmed that, as found in Cardinal, Kruger, and Dick, provincial laws of 
general application apply of their own force and effect to First Nations and 
their lands, notwithstanding s 91(24).137 Nonetheless, s 91(24) ‘protects a 
“core” of Indianness from provincial intrusion, through the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity’.138 As such, provincial laws that single out 
Indians as Indians are invalid as intruding on federal jurisdiction.139 The 
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Court also noted, however, that legislation has extended provincial authority 
over First Nations. Section 88 of the federal Indian Act referentially incorpo-
rates ‘provincial laws of general application which cannot apply to Indians 
and Indian lands because they touch on the Indianness at the core of s 
91(24)’.140 As the Court explained: 
[A] provincial law which regulated hunting may very well touch on this core. 
Although such a law would not apply to [A]boriginal people [by its own 
force], it would still apply through s 88 of the Indian Act, being a law of gen-
eral application.141 
Accordingly, while the provinces have no express power to enact legislation 
in relation to First Nations people or reserves, laws of general application 
may be incorporated as federal law and apply to First Nations people, even if 
that law would otherwise be invalid. 
Extension of provincial authority has continued. In Canadian Western 
Bank v Alberta,142 the Canadian Supreme Court reassessed the constitutional 
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. Holding that the doctrine ‘must 
facilitate, not undermine … “co-operative federalism”’,143 the Court ex-
plained that judges ‘should favour, where possible, the ordinary operation of 
statutes enacted by both levels of government’.144 In Tsilhqot’in Nation v 
British Columbia,145 the Canadian Supreme Court drew on this to greatly 
reduce the scope of the doctrine in First Nations matters. In a unanimous 
decision, the Court found that provincial legislation of general application 
does not just apply to reservations, but also to land held under Aboriginal 
title.146 
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Judicial decisions and the incorporation of provincial legislation have 
increased the scope of provincial activity on First Nations lands since 1867. 
When the Canadian Supreme Court recognised in Calder that Aboriginal title 
was part of Canadian law, and the federal government announced that it 
would negotiate comprehensive settlements with First Nations representa-
tives,147 it was clear that the provinces would have to play a substantial role 
in any process. Indeed, early treaty negotiations arose immediately from 
disputes over provincial activities. The James Bay and Northern Quebec 
Agreement, for instance, emerged out of a dispute over the construction of an 
extensive hydroelectric scheme in Northern Quebec, and settlement was 
eventually reached between representatives of the Cree and Inuit peoples, and 
Canadian and Quebec governments.148 Similarly, in British Columbia, treaty 
processes were catalysed by First Nation challenges to logging and resource 
extraction,149 activities regulated by the provincial government. 
Since 1973, 26 comprehensive land claims and four self-government 
agreements between First Nations and federal and provincial governments 
have been negotiated and signed, and around 100 more modern treaties are at 
various stages of negotiation.150 These treaties cover a significant area of 
Canada, stretching from British Columbia and Yukon in the west, to Nunavut 
in the north-east. Each treaty is specific to the particular First Nation, as well 
as to place, history and circumstance, but they all share a number of common 
elements relating to land ownership, resources, cultural heritage, financial 
compensation and reparations, and self-governance.151 Although several 
alternative approaches to treaty-making have developed, each obtains legal 
force through the same procedure. The settlement must be approved by the 
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relevant First Nation and is enacted as legislation by both the relevant 
provincial and federal parliaments.152 The same process was adopted for 
treaties in the Yukon Territory.153 On the other hand, while the Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement154 was negotiated with the Canadian and Northwest 
Territories governments, only the Canadian Parliament passed enabling 
legislation.155 
IV  TREATY-MAK IN G IN  AUS TR ALIA 
In Australia, no treaties were signed at first contact or in the early years of 
settlement,156 as formally there was no legal recognition that Indigenous 
communities were sovereign entities.157 This reflected the views of the time. 
Early colonial governments did not consider the interests of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples, expecting that they would be exterminated by 
the progress of civilisation.158 This was understood as a two-stage process: 
‘people of full descent would soon “die out”’ and Aboriginality ‘would 
disappear altogether through biological absorption’.159 This ‘dying race’160 
theory is one explanation for why the drafters of the Australian Constitution 
adopted a markedly distinct approach to the allocation of legislative authority 
over Indigenous affairs to the United States and Canada. 
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The Australian Constitution divides responsibilities between the several 
states and the federal government, with the powers of the Commonwealth 
Parliament enumerated in ss 51 and 52. As initially drafted, s 51(xxvi) 
empowered the Parliament to make laws with respect to ‘[t]he people of any 
race, other than the aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is deemed 
necessary to make special laws’, leaving responsibility for Indigenous affairs 
entirely in the hands of the states.161 This clause excluding Indigenous 
peoples from the Commonwealth’s domain was not a subject of debate 
during the Australian Constitution’s drafting.162 In addition, s 127 prohibited 
the counting of Aboriginal people in ‘reckoning the numbers of the people of 
the Commonwealth’. This prevented Aboriginal people from being counted 
in determining representation in the new national Parliament. 
Unlike in the United States and Canada, Indigenous peoples were viewed 
as the concern of the new states. Consequently, the federal government’s only 
involvement in Indigenous affairs was in the Northern Territory and the 
Australian Capital Territory through the territories power in s 122. This 
changed in 1967, when the Australian public voted in a referendum to amend 
the Australian Constitution to include Indigenous Australians in determina-
tions of population, and to empower the federal Parliament to legislate 
specifically for Indigenous peoples.163 Even then, unlike in Canada and the 
United States, there was no suggestion of exclusive federal power. Instead, 
the effect of the amendment was to retain state legislative power, while also 
conferring such power on the Commonwealth.164 As a result, the Australian 
state and national Parliaments hold concurrent power in this area, including 
over legislation to give effect to treaties with Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples. 
Reflecting Galarrwuy Yunupingu’s position expressed in the quote at the 
start of this article, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander aspirations for 
treaty-making have long centred on the federal government. In 1979, for 
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instance, the National Aboriginal Conference, an elected Indigenous body 
advising the federal government, passed a resolution calling for a ‘Makarrata’ 
between ‘the Aboriginal nation and the Australian government’.165 In 1983, 
the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs of the 
Australian Parliament delivered a report on the idea of a treaty, recommend-
ing constitutional change in order to implement a ‘compact’.166 Similarly, in 
1988, Prime Minister Bob Hawke adopted the Barunga Statement, promising 
to negotiate a treaty to respect and recognise Aboriginal sovereignty within 
the term of the Parliament.167 No treaty eventuated, however, and the idea 
was quietly shelved in 1991.168 Calls for a national treaty by the Council for 
Aboriginal Reconciliation and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (‘ATSIC’) in the new millennium also fell on deaf ears.169 
In recent years, the treaty debate has increasingly included state and terri-
tory governments. In the 2017 Uluru Statement from the Heart (‘Uluru 
Statement’), around 250 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander delegates from 
across Australia called for the establishment of a national Makarrata Com-
mission to ‘supervise a process of agreement-making between governments 
and First Nations’,170 implying treaties at both the state and national level. 
Although the federal government has so far ignored the push for a Makarrata 
Commission, over the last three years Victoria,171 the Northern Territory,172 
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Queensland,173 and South Australia174 have officially committed to enter 
treaty negotiations with Aboriginal peoples. 
Reflecting the political nature of these agreements, however, the situation 
is complex and subject to change. In June 2018, for instance, a newly elected 
South Australian government formally abandoned the treaty process.175 
Notwithstanding this step backwards, political leaders in several other states 
have indicated that they support treaty. For instance, the New South Wales 
Labor opposition had promised to hold treaty talks with Aboriginal nations 
within the state if it had won the 2019 state election.176 The Tasmanian Labor 
opposition made a similar promise, though it failed to secure election in 
2018.177 Treaties are not the sole province of Labor governments. As we have 
argued previously and this part will outline, the size and scope of a recent 
agreement signed between the Noongar people and the Liberal Western 
Australian government reveal it as Australia’s first treaty.178 Its implementa-
tion, however, indicates some of the challenges of treaty-making in federa-
tions. 
A  Western Australia 
In 2015, the Western Australian Liberal government signed the largest and 
most comprehensive agreement to settle Aboriginal interests in land in 
Australian history with the Noongar people.179 Involving 30,000 Noongar 
people, the settlement covers around 200,000 km² and ‘includes agreement 
on rights, obligations and opportunities relating to land, resources, govern-
ance, finance, and cultural heritage’, amounting to a total value of about $1.3 
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billion.180 In exchange for this package, the Noongar people have agreed to 
surrender all current and future claims relating to historic and contemporary 
dispossession.181 
Conducted under the framework of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (‘Na-
tive Title Act’), the Noongar Treaty takes the form of six Indigenous Land 
Use Agreements (‘ILUA’).182 Although not reached under a specific treaty 
process, the settlement’s size and scope indicate that it is Australia’s first 
treaty. It recognises the Noongar people as a distinct political community, 
was reached via a process of political negotiation respectful of each party’s 
equality of standing, and settles Noongar and non-Indigenous claims by 
recognising and establishing a limited form of self-governance as well as 
providing financing for the autonomous operation of that administration.183 It 
is important to acknowledge that the Noongar Treaty does not recognise self-
government rights to the same extent as modern treaties in Canada. By 
formalising mechanisms of self-governance, however, it may lead to more 
extensive settlements in the future.184 
That the settlement is properly considered a treaty was recognised by 
several parliamentarians at the time. Upon notification that the Noongar 
people had voted to accept it, Premier Colin Barnett issued a press release, 
noting that the ‘break-through agreement’ was ‘a historic achievement in 
reconciliation’ and an ‘extraordinary act of self-determination by Aboriginal 
people … provid[ing] them with a real opportunity for independence’.185 
Later that year, Western Australian Deputy Opposition Leader Roger Cook 
explained in Parliament that, ‘[b]y its very nature, the Noongar agreement is 
in fact a classic treaty’.186 
The Noongar Treaty reveals the complexities of treaty processes within 
the Australian federation. Negotiated between the Noongar people and the 
Western Australian government, the settlement was approved by the Noongar 
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people before being enacted in state legislation.187 Yet, the process was 
conducted under the framework of Commonwealth legislation, and the 
settlement will derive its force from registration under a Commonwealth 
Act.188 Introducing further challenges, the treaty has not yet taken effect. In 
February 2018, several objections were lodged by Noongar people against 
registering the ILUAs with the National Native Title Tribunal — a Com-
monwealth adjudicatory body.189 Those objections were struck out and the 
six ILUAs were finally registered on the Native Title Register in October 
2018.190 However, applications seeking judicial review of the Native Title 
Registrar’s decision were immediately lodged in the Federal Court,191 and 
any hearing is not expected to be held until midyear. The settlement will only 
commence if those applications are dismissed. 
B  Victoria 
The treaty process in Victoria emerged in early 2016. In February of that 
year, the Victorian government convened a meeting with representatives of 
Victorian Aboriginal communities to understand what they meant by self-
determination and discuss the national constitutional recognition process. At 
this meeting, Aboriginal representatives derided the national recognition 
debate as a ‘distraction’,192 and expressed their support for a treaty. These 
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views were reiterated at the statewide Aboriginal Victoria Forum held in May 
2016, where 500 participants unanimously agreed to advance self-
determination and a treaty by establishing an Aboriginal representative 
body.193 
The state government responded positively to these demands. It estab-
lished an Aboriginal Treaty Working Group to consult with Aboriginal 
Victorians over the design of an appropriate body to represent them in treaty 
negotiations, and to advise the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs on progress 
towards a treaty as well as ‘the broader self-determination agenda’.194 The 
Working Group is composed entirely of Aboriginal people with a balance 
between male and female representatives.195 It is not clan-based but is 
comprised of representatives of Victorian Aboriginal community organisa-
tions and members appointed in their individual capacity by the Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs.196 This approach has not been favoured by all; in April 
2017, Gunnai and Gunditjmara woman Lidia Thorpe resigned from her 
position on the Working Group when she felt her cultural integrity was being 
compromised.197 
Consultations were organised by the management consulting company EY 
to provide structural independence from government. Initial consultations 
took place at 10 locations across Victoria in the second half of 2016. Partici-
pants were asked what representation meant to them and discussed design 
principles as well as potential roles and functions of a putative Aboriginal 
representative body.198 A further six consultations were held in March 2017 to 
refine the structure and framework of the body. Community members 
considered who should be eligible to vote and stand for election, as well as 
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how the electorate should be divided.199 In an effort to ‘allow the community 
to drive the next steps in the Treaty process’,200 this latter round of consulta-
tions included a series of ‘Treaty Circles’. These community-run conversa-
tions were coordinated and supervised by self-nominated individuals who 
held discussions in their local area, with the aim of ‘ensuring maximum 
participation by as many members of the Victorian Aboriginal community as 
possible’.201 An online ‘Message Stick’ was created to allow those unable to 
attend a community consultation or Treaty Circle to have their say as well.202 
Approximately 7,500 Aboriginal Victorians (out of a 2016 self-reported total 
of 47,788) were consulted or engaged directly through this process.203 
The results of these consultations were presented to the Aboriginal Victo-
ria Forum at the end of April 2017. At this meeting, the state government 
committed to provide $28.5 million to progress the treaty process in the 
2017–18 budget.204 This funding included provision for an Aboriginal 
Community Assembly to discuss and provide further advice to the Working 
Group on the design of a representative body, and a Victorian Treaty Ad-
vancement Commission (‘VTAC’) to operationalise the outcomes of the 
Community Assembly.205 VTAC is empowered to guide the establishment of 
the representative body, maintain momentum for treaty, consult with Aborig-
inal Victorians, provide research and advice on the process, and keep all 
Victorians informed.206 Once the representative body is established, VTAC is 
to be abolished.207 
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All Aboriginal Victorians aged over 18 years were eligible to apply for 
membership of the Aboriginal Community Assembly.208 Three Aboriginal 
Victorians reviewed all applications, and 33 people were eventually selected 
to ensure accurate demographic representation in the Assembly.209 In 
November and December 2017, 31 of these members ‘from across Victoria 
with a diversity and wealth of cultural knowledge, expertise and experience’ 
met over six days to deliberate and provide their advice.210 That same month, 
Jill Gallagher was appointed the Victorian Treaty Advancement Commis-
sioner.211 A few months later, the Victorian government signalled its contin-
ued commitment to the treaty process by providing $9 million in the 2018–19 
budget for ‘[t]reaty and self-determination’.212 As the Treasury explained: 
Funding will be provided for the election of an independent Aboriginal Repre-
sentative Body as the voice chosen by Aboriginal Victorians to be the State’s 
counterpart in designing the treaty process, and to continue government prepa-
ration for the treaty. This will enable the Government and Aboriginal Repre-
sentative Body to work in partnership to establish the entities, rules and re-
source base necessary to facilitate future treaty negotiations.213 
In June 2018, the process took a considerable step forward, with the Victori-
an Parliament passing Australia’s first treaty bill. The Victorian Treaty 
Process Act creates a legislative basis for negotiating a treaty with Aboriginal 
people in the State. Under this Act, the government must recognise an 
Aboriginal-designed representative body that will administer a self-
determination fund to support Aboriginal Victorians in treaty negotiations.214 
The representative body will also work with government to establish a treaty 
negotiation framework, which must accord with several guiding principles 
set out in the Act: self-determination and empowerment; fairness and 
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equality; partnership and good faith; mutual benefit and sustainability; and 
transparency and accountability.215  
In February 2019, details concerning the state-wide representative body 
were announced. Established as a not-for-profit company rather than under 
legislation, the First Peoples Assembly of Victoria will be independent of 
government. Enrolment is open now, with elections scheduled to run from 16 
September – 20 October 2019.216 In order to maintain the Assembly’s 
independence, elections will be managed by VTAC and conducted by a 
private company instead of the Australian Electoral Commission. Cultural 
authority will also be respected: 12 representatives will be elected from 12 
formally recognised traditional owner groups with native title, Traditional 
Owner Settlement Act,217 or Registered Aboriginal Party218 status. Additional 
reserved seats will be added as more groups are added in the future. A further 
21 representatives will be elected from five voting regions based on the 
Aboriginal population of the region. An Elders Voice will also be established 
to guide the Assembly’s work and provide cultural strength and integrity. Its 
form is still being discussed.219 Significantly, the First Peoples Assembly will 
not then be disbanded but will continue to serve as a standing representative 
body of Aboriginal Victorians — a Voice to the Victorian Parliament.220 
The First Peoples Assembly will not negotiate for Aboriginal Victorians, 
but will simply assist in developing an appropriate framework.221 In the 
meantime, Aboriginal Victorians will need to organise their negotiating 
position, decide what treaty means to them, and what form a treaty or treaties 
should take. The final step will involve negotiations between the individual 
First Nations and the State. This stage could take many years. 
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The Commonwealth has not been involved in the Victorian process, but 
its spectre has influenced the discussion. As this section has noted, the 
process was initially catalysed by concern that the national debate on 
‘recognising’ Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in the Australian 
Constitution would fail to deliver meaningful reform. The federal govern-
ment has also frequently been invoked by participants within Parliament. The 
Victorian Opposition voted against the Victorian Treaty Process Act, contend-
ing that any treaty process ‘must be led by the [C]ommonwealth govern-
ment’,222 while Labor politicians have questioned why this is necessary: 
We are still left asking ourselves: why are we the only [C]ommonwealth coun-
try without a treaty with its First Nations people? Why would we wait for 
someone else to do it? Why would we as Victorians shirk that responsibility 
and not have our own people looked after? Why would we not lead the na-
tion?223 
The re-election of the Labor government in November 2018 means that the 
treaty process remains on track. 
C  Northern Territory 
In September 2016, incoming Northern Territory Chief Minister Michael 
Gunner declared that his government would establish a subcommittee on 
Aboriginal affairs to ‘drive public discussions on a treaty’ between the 
Territory and Aboriginal peoples.224 No firm commitment followed this 
announcement, but treaty remained on the government’s agenda. Concerns 
over the slow process led the Northern Land Council to hold a treaty work-
shop in Darwin in February 2018.225 At this workshop, representatives of the 
government reiterated their support for a treaty process. This led to a meeting 
between the four Aboriginal Land Councils and the Northern Territory 
government in April 2018, where the parties ‘agreed to establish a working 
group to develop a Memorandum of Understanding about how a treaty 
between the government and the [Northern Territory]’s Aboriginal people 
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should progress’.226 Chief Minister Gunner and representatives of the four 
Land Councils signed the memorandum of understanding at the Barunga 
Festival in 2018 — 30 years after Prime Minister Bob Hawke’s promise that 
Australia would enter into a treaty with Indigenous peoples.227 
The Barunga Agreement is intended to develop and implement a consulta-
tion process that will lead to a treaty negotiation framework.228 That consulta-
tion will be led by an independent Treaty Commissioner and is expected to 
take several years.229 The signatories have also agreed to several guiding 
principles, including that Aboriginal Territorians never ceded sovereignty of 
their lands, seas, and waters, and that a Northern Territory treaty should 
benefit all Territorians.230 The Barunga Agreement is not legally enforceable 
but all parties have signalled their commitment to implement its provisions in 
a ‘transparent, consultative and accountable manner’.231 It envisages a treaty 
as a substantive concept that will empower Aboriginal communities with real 
decision-making authority. At the same time, it understands treaty as offering 
the potential to ground ‘lasting reconciliation between the First Nations of 
the Territory and other citizens with the object of achieving a united Northern 
Territory’.232 
In February 2019, Yawuru professor of law Mick Dodson was appointed 
Treaty Commissioner.233 Over 12 months, Dodson will consult with Aborigi-
nal Territorians in order to understand their aspirations for treaty and consider 
an appropriate model, including whether there should be one Territory-wide 
treaty or multiple treaties. Within 18 months after the initial period of 
negotiations, Dodson must provide recommendations to the government 
about the best model for future negotiations. While the process is still in its 
preliminary stages, and will be based on the views of Aboriginal Territorians, 
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Dodson has indicated that any treaty must acknowledge past injustices, as 
well as provide material benefits, likely including financial compensation.234 
The Northern Territory is in a difficult constitutional position. As we ex-
plore further in Part V, its status as a territory leaves its legislative and 
executive authority to negotiate and execute a treaty somewhat uncertain. For 
this reason, the Northern Territory government has sought to include repre-
sentatives of the Commonwealth in the preliminary stages. The disinclination 
of the current federal government has made this difficult, but members of the 
opposition have been involved. For instance, Indigenous Labor parliamentar-
ians Linda Burney MP and Senators Patrick Dodson and Malarndirri McCar-
thy attended the Barunga Festival to witness the signing of the memorandum 
of understanding.235 At that meeting, Opposition Leader Bill Shorten argued 
that treaty-making ‘between our First Australians and [all] levels of govern-
ment within Australia’ is necessary for ‘proper and meaningful reconcilia-
tion’,236 suggesting that a future federal Labor government would support the 
Territory process. 
D  Queensland 
The Queensland Labor government initially adopted treaty as part of their 
policy platform in 2016. Discussion was brief, however, consisting of a 
single line committing the party to commece negotiations ‘within the next 
term of Parliament’.237 This commitment was expanded and extended in its 
2017 platform, in the lead-up to the state election. 
The 2017 platform provided greater detail on the government’s intentions, 
declaring that it would ‘establish [and] authorise a Treaty Working Group 
within the next term of Parliament to begin negotiations’.238 The Working 
Group would provide advice on the process and timing for negotiations, as 
well as guidance on community engagement, and examine proposals for a 
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permanent state-wide Aboriginal representative body.239 The composition of 
the Working Group was also elaborated upon: it would comprise at least 50% 
women and include nominees from Traditional Owner Corporations, the 
Queensland Indigenous Youth Parliament, and Aboriginal Controlled 
Community Organisations, as well as individual persons appointed by the 
Minister based on their experience and expertise.240 Following the Working 
Group’s establishment, forums would be held across the State to discuss its 
work and outline the next steps.241 
The Queensland Labor government was returned at the 2017 state elec-
tion, but no announcement regarding the treaty process was forthcoming.242 
Nonetheless, treaty remained party policy, and in 2018 reports indicated that 
a discussion paper authored by the Queensland Indigenous Labor Netork 
explored how the State could enter into negotiations with ‘individual 
sovereign nations’.243 It was not until July 2019, however, that a firm 
commitment was issued. 
On 14 July 2019, Queensland Deputy Premier Jackie Trad announced that 
the State would begin a conversation about a pathway to treaty with Aborigi-
nal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.244 In order to progress this commit-
ment, the government established a bipartisan eminent panel of Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous leaders, co-chaired by Indigenous academic Jackie 
Huggins and former Attorney-General Michael Lavarch. The panel will 
provide leadership and engage with key stakeholders across the State in the 
second half of 2019. The Treaty Working Group discussed in the 2017 policy 
platform, has not yet been established. Once it is set up, it will lead consulta-
tions with First Nations, allowing them to discuss and reach agreement on 
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what a treaty might contain.245 A discussion paper will also be released 
shortly. Negotiations are unlikely to begin for several years. 
Queensland has only recently formally adopted a treaty process, but the 
same question concerning whether it is appropriate for the State to enter 
negotiations with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples has already 
arisen. While Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk has urged other states to 
consider commencing treaty negotiations,246 particularly as the federal 
government appears to dismiss these calls,247 the Liberal National opposition 
has suggested that it would adopt different priorities.248 If the opposition wins 
the 2020 state election, it could abandon the process before negotiations even 
commence. 
E  South Australia 
In December 2016, the South Australian Labor government announced that it 
would commence discussions with three Indigenous nations whose tradition-
al land sits within State boundaries, with the aim of finalising a treaty.249 The 
process began two months later, when Dr Roger Thomas, a senior Kokatha 
and Mirning man, was appointed as Treaty Commissioner to lead consulta-
tion between Aboriginal people and the state government on a framework for 
a treaty.250 In only a few months, Dr Thomas and his team met with over 600 
people and received over 280 written submissions and responses to surveys, 
overwhelmingly supportive of a treaty.251 Based on the Treaty Commission-
er’s July 2017 report, the government invited Aboriginal nations in South 
Australia to submit expressions of interest to ‘enter a new relationship’ with 
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the State.252 Following this period, a newly established Aboriginal Treaty 
Advisory Committee recommended three Aboriginal nations — the Narung-
ga, Adnyamathanha, and Ngarrindjeri nations — take part.253 On 22 Septem-
ber 2017, the first negotiations in Australia between a government and an 
Indigenous nation explicitly understood as treaty discussions commenced 
between South Australia and the Ngarrindjeri nation.254 
Concern that the upcoming election might derail negotiations led the State 
government and Aboriginal nations to attempt to formalise the process. In 
February 2018, the day before the government entered caretaker mode, the 
Buthera Agreement between the Narungga nation and the South Australian 
government was signed, committing the parties to a three-year process of 
negotiations.255 That same month, the Ngarrindjeri Regional Authority and 
the State government signed an agreement noting the parties ‘wish to 
strengthen the[ir] relationship’, the State’s ‘desire[] to enter into a treaty’, and 
obligating the State to ‘promote a legislative structure that enables the parties 
to enter in the treaty negotiated between them’.256 
In March 2018, the Labor government was defeated,257 fuelling doubts 
about the viability of the process. The new Premier initially placed negotia-
tions on hold, pending a report from Dr Thomas.258 However, just two 
months later and on the same day that the Northern Territory government 
signed the Barunga Agreement, Premier Marshall declared state-based 
treaties ‘expensive gestures’ and announced that his government would 
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abandon the process, because treaties ‘should be negotiated at the federal 
level, not the state level’.259 
The South Australian example again illustrates the importance of the 
Commonwealth in Australian understandings of treaty-making. It also reveals 
the fragility of existing treaty processes: treaties are political agreements that 
require ongoing support from both sides.260 Only political and moral pres-
sure, not legal obligation, can push participants to the table. 
V  HO W SH OU LD  TREATIE S BE PURSUED IN  AUS TR A LIA?  
The United States and Canada offer distinct models for treaty-making in 
federations. In the United States, the allocation of constitutional responsibil-
ity ensured that the federal government alone negotiated treaties. In contrast, 
in Canada, judicial decisions and the devolution of legislative authority have 
transformed the relationship between First Nations and the provinces, such 
that modern comprehensive settlements are now negotiated with both federal 
and subnational governments. In the face of national inaction, a third model 
is developing in Australia: state- and territory-driven treaties. Is this the most 
desirable way for them to continue? Or should Australia adopt the approach 
taken in the United States or Canada? The answer to these questions relies on 
consideration of Australia’s constitutional framework. In this part we explore 
the respective strengths and weaknesses of treaty-making at both levels of 
government. We suggest that interlocking state and federal treaties offer the 
best prospect for reaching an enduring settlement that meets Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples’ aspirations within Australia’s public law 
framework. 
A  The Emerging Australian Approach: State- and Territory-Driven Treaties 
The state and territory treaty processes may have commenced in part as a 
response to the Commonwealth’s lacklustre commitment to meaningful 
constitutional recognition,261 but there are several important legal and 
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political rationales for treaty negotiations to be conducted at the state level. 
First, the allocation of responsibilities within the Australian federation 
suggests that states should be central to any treaty settlement. Like the 
position in Canada, the distribution of legislative and executive authority in 
Australia leaves the states with considerable legal authority over issues 
relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The Commonwealth 
Parliament enjoys only a concurrent power to legislate with respect to 
Indigenous affairs, and responsibility for many issues of concern for Indige-
nous peoples, including health, education, and housing, lies also with the 
states. Although a federal treaty could rest on the ‘race power’ in s 51(xxvi), 
acting to render invalid any inconsistent state legislation via s 109, it may not 
be feasible in practice. State legislation is complex, and legal challenges may 
result where a Commonwealth Act implementing a treaty intends to cover the 
field by way of using the blunt overriding force of s 109. Similarly, the terms 
of a treaty may include provisions relating to service delivery. As these are 
primarily state functions, it is appropriate that states lead, or at the very least, 
are substantially engaged in, negotiations. Without this, a treaty may lack the 
capacity to have a meaningful impact upon key state services of great 
importance to local Indigenous communities. 
Authority over land points to a second factor in favour of state-driven 
treaties. Australian law has recognised many Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander communities’ rights to land through native title or broader comple-
mentary land settlements.262 As the Native Title Act recognises, however, 
dispossession and settlement has meant that many Indigenous Australians are 
‘unable to assert native title rights and interests’.263 For groups unable to 
demonstrate connection to country,264 or who otherwise have not succeeded 
in gaining title, land will be a key element of any treaty as it would form the 
basis for political and economic empowerment. Significantly, most land that 
may be part of any agreement, including, for example, pastoral leases, is 
governed by state legislation,265 suggesting that negotiations should be 
conducted ‘directly with state governments’.266 Fortifying this position is the 
fact that states also have more flexibility than the Commonwealth in confer-
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ring rights to land. Unlike the Commonwealth,267 the states are not required 
to provide ‘just terms’ compensation in respect of any property acquired for 
the purpose of transferral to Indigenous peoples as part of a treaty settlement. 
Flexibility more generally underlies the third rationale that treaties be 
driven at the subnational level. State constitutions are more elastic than the 
Australian Constitution, meaning that treaties at this level may potentially 
allow more room for innovative settlements. For instance, drawing on the 
structural separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers in chs I, II 
and III of the Australian Constitution, the High Court has imposed strict 
constraints on the capacity of the Commonwealth to establish bodies exercis-
ing judicial power.268 These restrictions would preclude a putative federal 
Indigenous court from exercising a combination of conciliatory or mediatory 
and judicial functions, and would impose strict security of tenure require-
ments on judicial officers, contrary to traditional Indigenous practices. 
Importantly, the textual division of powers at the Commonwealth level is not 
present at the state level. Although the High Court has drawn on ch III to 
place constitutional limits on state authority, those limits only relate to the 
capacity of state Parliaments to alter their courts in a manner that would 
impair their institutional integrity as repositories of federal jurisdiction.269 
Consequently, far greater constitutional space for Indigenous dispute 
resolution systems exists at the state level. A state treaty could therefore 
recognise an Indigenous nation’s inherent authority to establish dispute 
resolution systems consistent with their customary laws and practices, so 
long as those courts did not exercise federal jurisdiction and so long as they 
were not inconsistent with existing Commonwealth laws. 
Fourth, it may also be politically appropriate for treaties to be conducted 
at the state level. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and communi-
ties are ‘diverse in culture and circumstance’ and consequently have very 
different needs and aspirations.270 State-based treaties can reflect these 
distinctions and empower disparate Indigenous nations located across the 
continent to reach agreement on specific areas of concern to them. It also 
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allows those Indigenous nations to exercise different tiers and forms of self-
governance, depending on their capacity and goals.271 A national or Com-
monwealth-based treaty, by contrast, may tend towards uniformity, leaving it 
unable to account for such distinctions. 
The sheer number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities 
across Australia points towards a fifth basis for subnational treaties. At a 
more prosaic level, it may simply be more feasible for states and territories to 
conduct negotiations, rather than require the Commonwealth to have carriage 
of multiple concurrent individual processes. This has certainly proved 
challenging in British Columbia, which is currently conducting separate 
negotiations with over 60 First Nations,272 and has only finalised seven 
agreements in 25 years.273 While the laboriously slow process has several 
causes, including the limited mandate of federal negotiators,274 it is likely that 
fewer simultaneous negotiations involving the federal government would 
enable settlements to be reached at a faster pace. A national treaty process 
could, of course, learn from and build on developments internally, but a key 
advantage of the existing process is that it shares burdens across jurisdictions, 
potentially enabling agreements to be struck in parallel. 
The proliferation of treaty processes in Australia underlies a sixth poten-
tial benefit of state- and territory-driven treaties. Scholars of federalism and 
federal theory have often noted that dividing political authority between and 
across multiple decision-making centres may encourage those political units 
to ‘serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments’,275 
enabling other communities to ‘profit by the experience of a law or a method 
which has worked well or ill’.276 Australian treaty processes can certainly 
learn from useful developments internationally — the development of interim 
measures in British Columbia as a means to respond to lengthy negotiations 
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would, for instance, likely prove beneficial in Victoria, the Northern Territo-
ry, and Queensland.277 Those processes can, however, also learn from each 
other. Putative treaty processes in New South Wales, Tasmania, and else-
where can assess and evaluate the processes conducted throughout Australia 
before establishing their own tailored approach. In this sense, having multiple 
state and territory processes fosters distinctive arrangements and (potentially) 
unique settlement outcomes that respond to each participant. Indeed, the 
Northern Territory process appears to be adopting and adapting elements 
from the Victorian process to the Territory’s own unique circumstances, 
which includes the existence of powerful Land Councils representing 
traditional owners.278 
Relatedly, multiple separate subnational processes can foster and encour-
age developments across Australia in the face of Commonwealth inaction. 
Successful state and territory processes may also build traction and catalyse 
federal engagement. This is apparent in other areas, including in relation to 
human rights protection in Australia. The Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and 
the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 Act (Vic) were key 
instruments that catalysed the Rudd Government’s 2008 National Human 
Rights Consultation.279 While a federal bill of rights did not follow, advocates 
continue to draw on the positive outcomes in the Australian Capital Territory 
and Victoria in making their case for a federal charter.280 
B  Exclusively Federal Treaties? 
There are political and legal advantages to conducting treaties at a state level 
in Australia. Several challenges also exist, however, and four key reasons 
suggest that, similarly to the United States, treaty negotiations should be the 
province of the federal government. 
First, state and territory borders do not correspond with or acknowledge 
traditional community boundaries, which often crisscross and intersect state 
borders. As Gerard Carney has explained, Australia’s state and territory 
borders do not even generally derive from geographical barriers such as 
mountain ranges and rivers, but surveyors’ best attempts to accurately 
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measure and mark the ‘celestially-described boundaries’ of longitude and 
latitude.281 In fact, emphasising the marked distance from Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander understandings of their country, the initial western 
border of New South Wales was defined by the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, an 
agreement between Portugal and Spain to divide the world outside Europe, 
ratified by papal bull.282 More than simply a historical curiosity, this fact can 
create real tensions for state-based treaty processes as it may mean that 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities whose land stretches 
across jurisdictions would feel unable to participate. The challenge of 
maintaining governance and administrative efficacy on the one hand and, on 
the other, ensuring that distinct Indigenous communities are empowered to 
represent themselves on their own terms, is a perennial problem for Indige-
nous communities within the Australian federation. For instance, Trisha Gray 
notes that when ATSIC’s electoral boundaries ‘were altered to bring the 
Warburton/Ceduna boundary into line with the South Australian and Western 
Australia border, the new line divided the Warburton mob, who refused to 
vote in the 1993 ATSIC election’.283 
This difficulty points to a second challenge. Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander communities dissected by state and territory borders may nonethe-
less choose to participate in treaty processes. In doing so, however, they may 
find that their state negotiating partners have different ideas or approaches to 
negotiations, which may lead to distinct rights operating within a single 
Indigenous community. What Megan Davis refers to as ‘[t]he uncoordinated 
pursuit of treaty across the federation’ may be particularly problematic for 
Indigenous communities whose traditional lands cross state borders, but the 
risk that some processes will result in weaker settlements than others is a 
problem for all state-based treaties.284 Politically, varying standards in 
settlements across the state and territories may weaken support for treaties 
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among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, putting its viability in 
doubt. Legally, unless state governments either agree among themselves to an 
appropriate standard (perhaps through the Council of Australian Govern-
ments, or commit to executing treaties in line with the standards affirmed in 
the UNDRIP),285 only a Commonwealth treaty process can harmonise treaty 
rights across jurisdictions,286 and ensure that all Indigenous nations obtain a 
similar set of minimum outcomes while providing opportunities for addition-
al and distinctive provisions relating to the unique circumstances or needs of 
the relevant Indigenous nation. 
Third, politically, some Indigenous communities may be uneasy, or even 
hostile, to the idea of negotiating with subnational entities. First Nations in 
the United States and Canada draw on the historic treaties reached with 
agents of the federal government or British and Canadian Crowns to articu-
late a distinctive relationship with the state.287 While this is not always 
recognised, it retains important rhetorical and political value to Indigenous 
nations, signifying both broken treaty promises and a historical standard on 
which to ground a more equitable contemporary relationship.288 The absence 
of historic treaties between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and 
the British Crown or colonial governments mean Indigenous nations in 
Australia cannot premise their aspirations on similar grounds. Nonetheless, 
they maintain that sovereignty was never ceded,289 conceive a treaty process 
as being ‘about recognition of the ongoing dimensions of that sovereignty’,290 
and assert that their status as prior self-governing communities entitles them 
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to a distinctive nation-to-nation relationship.291 As Galarrwuy Yunupingu 
noted, an agreement or treaty with a subnational entity may challenge that 
status, and may cause some Indigenous communities to opt out of any 
negotiation.292 This is a risk for all state-based treaties but may be particular-
ly challenging for Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory and the 
Australian Capital Territory. As federal territories, both are subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commonwealth.293 
The final significant challenge facing state-driven treaties is a legal one. 
Unlike the situation in Canada where modern treaty settlements are constitu-
tionally protected,294 in Australia the Commonwealth Parliament may 
invalidate any eventual settlement. This problem is particularly acute for 
treaties struck at the territory level, because territories’ legislative and 
executive authority is not inherent but is delegated from the Australian 
Constitution.295 Take the Northern Territory as an example. Although the 
conferral of executive powers is very broad,296 and its legislative authority is 
plenary,297 the Northern Territory is subject to important limitations that mean 
it may not have the authority to agree to, or enact legislation to give effect to, 
certain terms without Commonwealth support. 
Territory laws must operate consistently with, or not repugnantly to, the 
Australian Constitution as well as legislation enacted by the Commonwealth 
Parliament.298 Although there is no Commonwealth Act precluding the 
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enactment of legislation to give effect to a treaty, existing Commonwealth 
laws may prevent certain terms from being part of any settlement. For 
instance, ss 15AB(1)(b)(i) and 16AA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) preclude 
bail authorities and judicial officers from taking into account ‘any form of 
customary law or cultural practice’ as a reason for ‘excusing, justifying, 
authorising, requiring or lessening the seriousness of the alleged criminal 
behaviour’, subject to certain exceptions, when determining whether to grant 
bail or pass sentence to a person charged or convicted of an offence against a 
Northern Territory law. These provisions would preclude an exclusively 
Northern Territory treaty from empowering Aboriginal law in certain forms. 
Further, even if the Northern Territory does have the authority to negotiate 
and execute a treaty with Aboriginal Territorians, the Commonwealth could 
revoke self-government powers to invalidate any treaty settlement. This is 
because there is no legal restraint on the Commonwealth Parliament from 
using its legislative powers under s 122 of the Australian Constitution to 
override Territory legislation, or to diminish or revoke self-government over 
certain matters. If it was so inclined, the Commonwealth could override any 
or all parts of a treaty entered into with a territory. 
This is not an idle threat; the Commonwealth has acted under s 122 to 
overrule Northern Territory legislation in recent times. In 1997, the Com-
monwealth Parliament enacted the Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth), which 
overruled the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1996 (NT) (‘RTI Act’), and 
revoked the Territory’s legislative authority over euthanasia.299 More 
recently, in 2007, the Commonwealth Parliament passed a package of 
legislation to give effect to the Northern Territory Intervention.300 It is 
impossible to predict whether a future Commonwealth Parliament would act 
in a similar way with regard to a Northern Territory treaty. Reflecting on the 
experience of the RTI Act, Graham Nicholson, former Northern Territory 
Crown Solicitor, has argued, however, that 
arguments based on the importance, authority and permanency of Territory 
Self-Government, its basic constitutional legislation and its constitutional con-
 
 299 Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth) schs 1–2; NT Self-Government Act (n 297) s 50A. A recent 
effort to reverse this prohibition failed in the Senate by 34:36 votes: Parliament of Australia, 
Journals of the Senate (Senate Journal No 108, 15 August 2018) 3459, 3486. 
 300 Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth); Social Security and Other 
Legislation Amendment (Welfare Payment Reform) Act 2007 (Cth); Families, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs and Other Legislation Amendment (Northern Territory 
National Emergency Response and Other Measures) Act 2007 (Cth); Appropriation (North-
ern Territory National Emergency Response) Act (No 1) 2007–2008 (Cth); Appropriation 
(Northern Territory National Emergency Response) Act (No 2) 2007–2008 (Cth). 
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ventions, will carry little weight in federal circles when either the national in-
terest or perceived federal matters are at stake, or when the subject of debate is 
seen by federal parliamentarians as being of sufficient interest and political 
value to override or simply ignore issues of Self-Government.301 
Even the moral force that comes from a settlement with Aboriginal Territori-
ans may not legally protect it from Commonwealth intrusion. 
These examples indicate some of the specific challenges facing the North-
ern Territory treaty process, but all state- or territory-based negotiations face 
constitutional vulnerabilities. Indeed, the Commonwealth could overrule any 
state treaty as well. While the Commonwealth Parliament is not able to 
diminish or revoke the legislative power of the states, under s 109 of the 
Australian Constitution, Commonwealth legislation prevails over incon-
sistent state legislation to the extent of any inconsistency. The terms of any 
Victorian treaty, for example, could be overridden by Commonwealth 
legislation grounded on the race power in s 51(xxvi). Although there is some 
uncertainty as to the scope of s 51(xxvi), the orthodox position is that the 
race power permits the Commonwealth Parliament to enact legislation that 
imposes a disadvantage on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.302 
This suggests that the Parliament could legislate to deny the effectiveness of 
the terms of a treaty signed by Victoria, or any other state. It also means that 
any exclusively subnational treaty must conform to existing Commonwealth 
legislation. Any state treaty would need to be consistent with the Native Title 
Act, for example. 
In assessing the legal vulnerability of state treaty processes it is important 
to note that a Commonwealth treaty will not be legally impregnable. In the 
absence of constitutional protection of treaty rights, a future federal Parlia-
ment could enact legislation to abrogate any national treaty settlement as 
well. In this sense, the constitutional position of treaties with Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples will be similar to that in the United States, 
where the Supreme Court has held that treaty rights are defeasible by 
congressional action.303 This vulnerability could only change if a referendum 
 
 301 Graham Nicholson, Lectures on Northern Territory Public Law (Law Society Northern 
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 302 Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 383 [94] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); 
Robert French, ‘The Race Power: A Constitutional Chimera’ in HP Lee and George Winter-
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206. Cf Harry Hobbs, ‘Revisiting the Scope of the Race Power after McCloy’ (2016) 27(4) 
Public Law Review 264. 
 303 United States v Wheeler, 435 US 313, 323 (Stewart J for the Court) (1978). 
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on constitutional recognition limited the race power, inserted a protection 
against racial discrimination, or protected treaty rights. This means that any 
Commonwealth treaty — like any state or territory treaty — will be vulnera-
ble to federal legislative override. 
C  Interlocking State and Federal Treaties 
The distribution of powers under the Australian Constitution suggests that 
problems exist with both subnational and federal treaties. Although both 
processes may lead to agreements that secure vital goals for the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander communities that sign them, the settlements will be 
limited in important ways. Consider just one potential term of any treaty: 
recognition of Aboriginal law. Successive comprehensive inquiries have 
established the continuing dynamism and vitality of Aboriginal law.304 
Unsurprisingly, legal recognition and acceptance of these systems is an 
aspiration of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.305 As we noted, 
however, constitutional prohibitions will preclude exclusively federal treaties 
from recognising Indigenous dispute resolution systems, while Common-
wealth legislation may prevent subnational treaties from recognising ele-
ments of Aboriginal law. This problem can be avoided by broadly adopting 
the Canadian approach and negotiating treaties with both the relevant 
subnational and national government. 
Interlocking subnational–national treaties can also avoid the difficulty of 
existing treaty processes resulting in varied legal recognition of Indigenous 
rights across the country. Although specific outcomes will differ according to 
the unique circumstances and aspirations of each party, including the 
Commonwealth in each process should ensure a minimum standard for all 
negotiations and settlements. A minimum standard does not necessarily mean 
losing the advantages of laboratory federalism, however. Rather, a consistent 
process and clear minimum guidelines for settlement outcomes may empow-
er Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities to reach distinctive 
arrangements that reflect their own priorities. 
 
 304 See, eg, Australian Law Reform Commission, Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws 
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Aboriginal Law and Culture (Final Report Project 94, September 2006) 80. 
 305 See, eg, ‘The Kalkaringi Statement’ (1998) 4(15) Indigenous Law Bulletin 14; UNDRIP (n 
22) art 27. 
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One way that this could be achieved is via an Australian Treaty Commis-
sion. In the Uluru Statement, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
called for exactly this, asking the federal government to establish a Makarrata 
Commission to supervise a process of agreement-making across the country. 
The Uluru Statement also called for a national Indigenous representative 
body — a First Nations Voice — empowered to advise Parliament on laws 
that affect Indigenous peoples.306 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples have explained that the Voice is their first priority.307 Among other 
reasons, this is because a national representative body could ensure that the 
design of the Makarrata Commission reflects their own aspirations. It is, of 
course, vital that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ interests drive 
the design of the Commission and maintain control over its framework, but it 
may be appropriate for the Commission to be composed of Indigenous 
representatives, as well as representatives of federal, state, and local govern-
ments. This model is similar to the British Columbia Treaty Commission,308 
but responds to Australia’s constitutional framework. Indeed, by ensuring 
representatives of each tier of government are present, a Makarrata Commis-
sion would create an environment where potentially thorny issues arising 
from concurrent and interlocking constitutional powers over Indigenous 
affairs can be managed. In addition to the issues canvassed above, the 
presence of local government may allow treaty settlements to include 
particular reparative justice elements, including, for example, the renaming 
of creeks and other local areas. 
A Makarrata Commission can also manage the risk that a significant dis-
parity in power, resources, and capacity will affect the process and terms of 
any agreement. Clearly, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples will be 
at a disadvantage in any negotiation, particularly if negotiations include 
representatives of three tiers of Australian government. A specially designed 
Commission empowered to ensure that all participants act in good faith and 
providing for internal dispute resolution without leading to an abandonment 
of attempts to reach settlement can minimise this risk. Formalising the 
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 308 The British Columbia Treaty Commission is an independent and impartial body composed of 
five Commissioners: two appointed by First Nations; one each by the federal and provincial 
governments; and one further Commissioner agreed to by the three parties. The Commission 
facilitates treaty negotiations by ‘monitoring developments and by providing, when neces-
sary, methods of dispute resolution’: McKee (n 149) 33. See also British Columbia Treaty 
Commission Act, SC 1995, c 45, ss 4–5. 
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Victorian negotiation framework,309 or establishing structures to encourage 
its adoption across the country, would be a positive start. 
This does not mean that existing state processes should be abandoned. 
Although they may not be able to deliver all outcomes desired by Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples, they are vital processes that are already 
engendering critical leadership and momentum in this space. In the absence 
of federal government involvement, they should continue. If the Common-
wealth reconsiders its position, it can learn from the steps taken in Victoria, 
Northern Territory, Queensland, and potentially elsewhere, and respond with 
the national overarching structure we have proposed. 
Interlocking treaties with federal, state, and potentially local governments 
will not avoid all difficulties, however. Two key challenges discussed above 
will persist. First, some Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities 
may choose not to participate in any process that operates under Australian 
law. As Tanganekald, Meintangk and Boandik professor of law Irene Watson 
has argued, recognition of Indigenous sovereignty by or within Australian 
law ‘inevitably reinstates colonial law’,310 and thus leaves Indigenous 
peoples ‘subservient to the rules of the state’.311 For scholars and activists 
like Watson, domestic treaty settlements fail to accord the respect Indigenous 
political communities deserve and will therefore fail to generate transforma-
tional change. 
This anxiety may be more pronounced in any process that includes subna-
tional governments, as Indigenous communities may be concerned that 
recognition of state or territory governments could detract from or diminish 
their inherent sovereignty.312 This is a legitimate choice for a community to 
make. Nonetheless, as any treaty in Australia will legally be reached based on 
an assumption of overriding sovereignty of the state, we consider that 
questions or disputes over sovereignty are insoluble, and best avoided in any 
treaty process. As the Canadian Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
concluded in 1996, ‘detailed examination of sovereignty is ultimately a 
distraction’, for ‘[d]ifferences in deep political beliefs are best dealt with by 
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fashioning a mutually satisfactory and peaceful coexistence’.313 Treaties are 
political agreements that are best conceived as efforts to renegotiate the terms 
on which this continent is shared. This discussion can be undertaken while 
‘putting to one side any questions of sovereignty’.314 
Second, in the absence of constitutional amendment, any treaty settlement 
in Australia will remain legally vulnerable. It is important, therefore, that a 
political cost is imposed on a government that contemplates abrogating the 
terms of any treaty. One way that this could be imposed is via constitutional 
entrenchment of a First Nations Voice.315 Proponents of the Voice have 
suggested that a national Indigenous representative body empowered to 
advise the federal Parliament on issues of concern to Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples will contribute to the development of a political 
convention that inhibits Parliament from enacting legislation contrary to 
Indigenous peoples’ interests.316 Whether such a convention develops 
depends on several features of the representative body, including its legitima-
cy within the Indigenous community, its credibility within government and 
the public at large, and the personal relationships between members of the 
body and Parliament. Ultimately, however, political conventions can be 
displaced. Australian governments have historically obtained political 
mileage by acting contrary to the interests of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples.317 It is impossible to state with any certainty that a constitu-
tionally entrenched First Nations Voice would prevent this. 
VI   CO NC LU S IO N 
In this article, we have explored three distinct approaches to treaty-making 
with Indigenous peoples. In the United States, while many legal agreements 
are negotiated at a subnational level, treaties are an exclusively federal 
responsibility. In Canada, modern treaties are conducted by both provincial 
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and federal governments. In Australia, treaty processes are being driven by 
the states and territories. The distinction observed between the United States 
and Canada derives from each state’s specific constitutional framework and 
their allocation of legislative and executive authority. The same is true in 
Australia. Although the ongoing processes largely reflect a political reality, 
they are possible due to the distribution of power under the Australian 
Constitution. Unlike the United States and Canada, both state and federal 
governments are empowered to negotiate treaties with Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples. 
The allocation of constitutional authority in Australia provides both op-
portunities and challenges for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
Most significantly, it permits multiple treaty processes to commence even in 
circumstances where the Australian government refuses to countenance a 
national process. Conversely, it means that although state and territory 
treaties may lead to positive settlements that secure meaningful outcomes for 
Indigenous communities, those agreements may not be capable of realising 
all Indigenous aspirations. State and territory governments are precluded 
from including certain terms in any treaty. These complexities suggest that it 
is preferable for treaties to be negotiated between Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander communities and both federal and subnational governments. 
This arrangement responds to the unique distribution of legislative authority 
in the Australian federation, enabling Indigenous communities to negotiate in 
a single process with each tier of government to secure a comprehensive 
agreement. While some Indigenous peoples and communities may be hesitant 
about or hostile to the idea of negotiating with second and third order tiers of 
government, exploration of contemporary agreement-making in the United 
States and Canada reveals the value of such agreements. The increasing 
complexity of personal and legal relations in contemporary society means 
that, unlike at first contact, the interests and aspirations of Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous peoples are intertwined, and many more parties now need to 
be consulted before agreements can be reached. 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have called on the Australi-
an government to establish a Makarrata Commission to supervise a process 
of agreement-making. Reflecting the distribution of legislative authority in 
Australia, a Makarrata Commission could be comprised of representatives of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and federal, state, and 
local governments. Potentially modelled on the British Columbia Treaty 
Commission, a Makarrata Commission could develop and enforce a treaty 
framework that encouraged all participants to negotiate in good faith. Such a 
Commission would be a valuable forum to drive positive and productive 
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settlements in Australia that conform to the structures of the Australian 
federation. 
In the meantime, the existing state- and territory-based processes have 
their challenges, and they may not be able to realise all Indigenous aspira-
tions. Nonetheless, they are valuable and should continue until and unless the 
federal government reconsiders its position. Subnational treaties can lead to 
innovative settlements that secure important outcomes for the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander communities who sign them. Moreover, in propelling 
the debate forward, these processes are building pressure on recalcitrant state, 
territory and federal governments, and eventually may catalyse a comprehen-
sive, unified, interlocking treaty process, supervised by a Makarrata Com-
mission. 
